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I. INTRODUCTION
Edna Marie Leach was a healthy, energetic, seventy year-old woman who lived
with her husband, Gifford, in a modest home near Akron, Ohio.1 Edna and Gifford
had two grown children who no longer lived with their parents. Edna maintained
close relationships with her children and her siblings, and she had many friends in
the community.2
One day, Edna began suffering from lower back pain, followed by muscle
weakness in her lower body. She began walking hunched-over and finally visited a
physician to seek treatment for her ailments. Edna was diagnosed with a
progressive, disabling disease of the nervous system, named amyotrophic lateral
sclerosis.3 Edna’s physician informed her that this disease was terminal and would
eventually physically incapacitate her. Edna’s physician estimated that she would
die from the disease within three to five years.
Following her diagnosis, Edna informed family members and friends that she did
not wish to be kept alive by artificial means, such as machines. She stated that the
idea of being kept alive by machines terrified her. Edna made similar statements to
her husband, sister, two cousins, and various friends. One month after her diagnosis,
Edna’s health rapidly deteriorated. Shortly after being admitted to a local hospital
for respiratory distress, Edna suffered a cardiac arrest.
Cardiopulmonary
resuscitation4 was successfully administered, and a respirator was surgically inserted

1
See generally Leach v. Akron Gen. Med. Ctr., (Leach I), 426 N.E.2d 809 (Summit
County Ct. Com. Pl.1980). The facts regarding Edna Leach as contained within the
introduction of this note can be found in the court’s opinion. See generally id.
2

Id.

3

Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis is defined as “a rare fatal progressive degenerative disease
that affects pyramidal motor neurons, usually begins in the middle age, and is characterized
especially by increasing and spreading muscular weakness—abbreviation ALS; it is also called
Lou Gehrig’s disease.” Dictionaryreference, http://www.dictionaryreference.com/search?q=
amyotrophic%20lateral20sclerosis.
4
Cardiopulmonary resuscitation is defined as “a procedure designed to restore normal
breathing after cardiac arrest that includes the clearance of air passages to the lungs, mouth-tomouth method of artificial respiration, and heart massage by the exertion of pressure on the
chest.” Dictionaryreference, http://www.dictionaryrefernce.com/search?r=2&q=cardiopulmo
nary%20resuscitation.
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into her trachea to facilitate breathing. A nasogastric tube was also inserted into her
stomach to facilitate the administration of nutrition.
Edna’s physicians diagnosed her as being in a permanent, chronic, vegetative
state.5 Despite protests by Edna’s husband and children of her intentions to not be
kept alive in that state, Edna’s physician informed her family that according to Ohio
law, “life support could only be terminated by a court order.”6 Five months later,
after an evidentiary hearing that included the testimony of seventeen witnesses,7 a
court order was issued directing the termination of Edna’s life support.8 Three weeks
after the order was issued, Edna’s respirator was finally disconnected, and she
subsequently died.9
Following Edna’s death, her family sought to recover damages from the hospital
for “pain, suffering, and mental anguish”10 on behalf of their mother and
themselves.11 Additionally, her family alleged that the hospital administered
treatments without proper consent.12 Prior to the Leach family’s lawsuit in 1980,
Ohio courts did not have Ohio statutory or case law to guide them in their decision
regarding whether a terminally ill patient had the right to refuse future medical
treatment.13 While the Leach family did not successfully recover damages at trial,
5
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.01 (U) (West 2006).
“Permanently unconscious state”

means a state of permanent unconsciousness in a declarant or other patient that, to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty as determined in accordance with reasonable
medical standards by the declarant's or other patient's attending physician and one
other physician who has examined the declarant or other patient, is characterized by
both of the following: (1) Irreversible unawareness of one's being and environment
[and] (2) Total loss of cerebral cortical functioning, resulting in the declarant or other
patient having no capacity to experience pain or suffering.
Id.
6

Leach I, 426 N.E.2d at 811. (“In Ohio, at this time, the court system provides the only
mechanism which can protect the interest of the doctor, the hospital, the patient, the family
and the state, which can objectively weigh the competing interests in an emotionally charged
situation, and which can insulate the participants from civil and criminal liability.”) See also
Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, (Leach II), 469 N.E.2d 1047, 1052 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
7

Leach I, 426 N.E.2d at 811.

8

Leach II, 469 N.E.2d. at 1051.

9

Id.

10

Id. at 1055.

11

Id.

12

Id. at 1051, 1055 (the plaintiffs “allege[d] that some of [the] treatments [she received]
were experimental.”). Although the Leach family was unsuccessful in its attempt to recover
damages under the common law theory of informed consent through court proceedings, the
defendant-hospital ultimately settled out of court for $50,000. See Vicki Joiner Bowers, Elder
Law Symposium: Comment: Advance Directives: Peace of Mind or False Security?, 26
STETSON L. REV. 677, 702 n.138 (1996).
13

Leach I, 426 N.E.2d at 816.
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the Leach court was the first Ohio court to proclaim that the right to privacy, as
encompassed within the United States Constitution, protected the right of a
terminally ill patient in a permanent, vegetative state, to refuse medical treatment.14
Because competent patients generally have the right to refuse medical treatment,
a person has the option to express his or her wishes regarding future medical care in
the form of a written document called an advance directive. In fact, many people
plan for mental incapacity later in life by executing advance directives15 that would
take effect if they were declared incompetent as a result of disease or injury.16 An
advance directive sets out, in writing, a person’s desires regarding medical treatment
in the event that the person cannot orally do so as a result of a mentally debilitating
disease or injury. It is a written declaration that a patient can use to accept or refuse
future medical treatment.17 When properly executed, an advance directive can be
relied on by healthcare providers as a legal declaration of the patient’s wishes.
Edna Leach died almost twenty-five years ago.18 Since that time, Ohio has
adopted the Modified Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act 19 which governs the
use and execution of written advance directives as expressions of a patient’s desire to
consent to or refuse future medical treatment. However, the Act also includes a
provision that grants both civil and criminal immunity to health care providers who
do not comply with a person’s written advance directive. Unfortunately, because of
the grant of civil and criminal immunity encompassed within the adopted written
advance directive statutes, Ohio law today does not afford any greater protection of a
patient’s right to refuse medical treatment at the end-of-life through the use of a
written declaration than it did when Edna Leach’s wishes, as orally conveyed by her
family, were disregarded at the end of her own life. In 2006, Ohio citizens, when
confronting their own end-of-life decisions and considering the use of written
advance directives, cannot be certain that their families will be spared the grief that
the Leach family endured while they watched their mother be kept alive against her
wishes in 1980.
14

Id.

15

See generally Last Acts: Means to a Better End, A Report on Dying in America Today,
19 (2002), available at http://www.rwjf.org/files/publications/other/meansbetterend.pdf.
(“Currently, 47 states and the District of Columbia have laws authorizing living wills.”). See
also David M. English & Alan Miesel, Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act Gives New
Guidance, Est., at 355 (Dec. 1994).
16

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.02 (West 2006); § 2133.03 (A) (1). For a detailed
discussion of “never-competent persons” and end-of-life decisions, see Norman L. Cantor,
J.D., The Bane of Surrogate Decision-Making Defining the Best Interests of Never-Competent
Persons, 26 J. LEGAL MED. 155 (2005).
17

In this note, the term “advance directive” is used as a general phrase that encompasses
written declarations of a patient’s right to make decisions about the health care they wish to
consent to or refuse concerning end-of-life decisions, including living wills.
18
19

Leach II, 469 N.E.2d at 1051.

1991 Ohio Legis. Bill 159, 166-76 (LexisNexis) (codified as OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2133.01-15 (2006)). For a detailed analysis of the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act
and the Uniform Health Care Decisions Act as adopted in the fifty states, see generally
Bretton J. Horttor, A Survey of Living Will and Advanced Health Care Directives, 74 N.D. L.
REV. 233 (1998).
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This article will argue that Ohio law does not adequately protect an individual’s
right to autonomy when exercised through the implementation of an advance
directive. In Part II, this article will examine the growing need for advance
directives and attribute this need to the evolution of medical treatments, such as
CPR, and the fear health care providers have regarding the inaccuracy and
unreliability of a patient’s orally expressed wishes regarding medical treatment as
communicated through a patient’s family members and loved ones. Part III will
examine the history of the right to autonomy in Ohio, with specific emphasis on the
Leach case and the Modified Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act. Part IV will
show how Ohio courts have undermined patients’ rights to refuse medical treatment
through the use of a written advance directive by prohibiting recovery to patients
whose written advance directives have been blatantly disregarded and thus, have
sued health care providers under Ohio’s only permissible causes of action of
negligence, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Finally, Part V
will propose a four-part resolution, comprised of: repealing civil and criminal
immunity; codifying a patient’s right to seek a remedy; recognition of a national
advance directive form; and encouraging awareness of a national living will
directory.
II. THE GROWING NEED FOR ADVANCE DIRECTIVES
Patients can communicate their wishes regarding future health care decisions to
health care providers through the use of advance directives in the form of either
living wills or durable powers of attorney for health care,20 which take effect in the
event that the patient is declared incompetent.21 While living wills expressly convey
a patient’s wishes to a health care provider in the event that the patient becomes
permanently unconscious or terminally ill, durable powers of attorney for health care
appoint an authorized person, such as a family member or loved one, to make

20

Financial and Health Care Planning for the Elderly in Ohio § 1-8, (Matthew Bender &
Co., Inc. ed.) (2004).
The two legal documents available for advance direction of health care decisions are
the durable power of attorney for health care (‘DPAHC’) or other form of proxy and
the living will. The living will is an advance ‘instruction directive’ to be followed in
terminal or unconscious conditions. It directly tells the health care provider the
patient's wishes; that is, it is self-executing. A DPAHC is a ‘proxy directive;’ it names
an agent to make health care decisions for the patient at any time when he is unable to
do so, although it may also include instructions from the patient. It is broader in scope
than the living will, not being limited to treatment decisions in terminal or
unconscious conditions, unless otherwise specified.
Id. Durable powers of attorney are outside the scope of this note. For statutory authority
governing the use and implementation of durable powers of attorney in Ohio, see generally
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.11-17 (West 2006).
21

Patients who were once competent, but later are determined incompetent due to age,
illness or disease, are the focus of this note. This note does not address the legal
complications that arise with patients who have never been competent, such as persons born
severely disabled. For an in-depth analysis of the issues presented with decision-making and
profoundly disabled persons, see Norman L. Cantor, The Relation Between Autonomy-Based
Rights and Profoundly Mentally Disabled Persons, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 37 (2004).
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medical decisions on behalf of the patient once a physician determines that the
patient has become incompetent.22
In most states, an advance directive must comply with certain formalities in order
to be legally executed, and hence, deemed reliable by health care providers. An
advance directive is intended to be a reliable and accurate reflection of a person’s
desires regarding difficult medical treatment decisions. Without a written document
that clearly expresses an incompetent patient’s wishes regarding medical treatment,
the only method health care providers have to ascertain the patient’s desires are the
second-hand accounts of family members or loved ones. Because of the inherent
reliability problems with second-hand accounts of a person’s desires regarding
difficult and emotionally charged medical decisions, health care providers often fear
legal liability may arise if it were later discovered that the second-hand accounts
were in fact inaccurate reflections of the patient’s wishes.23 Thus, advance directives
are extremely useful as direct and reliable expressions of a patient’s wishes.
Because a patient must be legally competent in order to make a rational,
informed choice regarding medical care, states may establish special procedural
safeguards to protect incompetent patients from having treatment withheld that the
patient, were she competent, would herself choose to consent.24 Such safeguards
may include, in the absence of a written declaration, the requirement of a court order,
as in the case of Edna Leach. Other safeguards are manifested in the form of
statutory guidelines governing the execution of advance directives, such as requiring
that the patient clearly express her wishes while still competent.25 These safeguards,
however, may inadvertently obstruct a patient’s right to refuse medical treatment by
requiring authenticated legal documentation that may be impractical or even
impossible to obtain on short notice.
As life-sustaining technology evolves in the health care setting, advance
directives play an increasingly important role for incompetent patients. Patients’ fear
of the administration of futile life-sustaining medical treatment, including
cardiopulmonary resuscitation, combined with the public’s interest in protecting
incompetent patients’ lives, has made advance directives and living wills an
indispensable component in planning for end-of-life medical care.
A. The Misuse and Fear of Futile Medical Treatments Have Increased the Need for
Written Advance Directives
Life-sustaining medical treatment is frequently administered in health care
settings, even when the patient has no hope of recovery. Advance directives can
guide a health care provider in determining whether a particular course of treatment
22

See generally Ohio’s Durable Power of Attorney for Healthcare statute at § 1337.11-17;
see also Leach II, 469 N.E.2d at 1052.
23
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 268 (1990) (finding that Nancy
Cruzan's statements “to her roommate regarding her desire to live or die under certain
conditions were ‘unreliable for the purpose of determining her [intent].’”
24
25

Id. at 280.

For a detailed analysis of the standard of proof required by some states regarding an
incompetent patient’s right to refuse medical treatment, see generally Martha McKinley Gray,
Treatment Decisions: Making Them and Having Them Made for You, 1 J. PHARMACY & L. 39
(1992).
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would be deemed lifesaving or life-extending by the patient who is subject to the
treatment and would give patients more autonomy over deciding whether or not to
receive treatment that may be futile. Additionally, advance directives would
decrease the risk that life-sustaining medical treatment would be administered
because of a family member’s inability to “let go,” even if such administration is not
in the patient’s best interest.
In the absence of a legally executed written declaration, health care providers will
likely look to the patient’s family members to decide on the course of treatment that
the family members wish to pursue. However, family members may not necessarily
pursue the course of treatment that the patient herself would have chosen. During
the emotionally charged circumstances which often accompany decisions regarding
life-sustaining medical treatment, family members may find it impossible to
determine that their loved one should not receive certain life-sustaining treatment.
Thus, even where a health care provider determines that a patient is not likely to
recover from or survive independently of life-sustaining treatment, there is an
increased risk that such treatment may be administered in cases where the treatment
merely serves to prolong physical death.
As the health care setting has evolved over the past 100 years, more people today
die in hospital or nursing care settings as opposed to in their own homes.26 This
reality presents a moral dilemma regarding death and dying that never before arose
in the traditional in-home setting due to the availability of life-sustaining medical
treatments in hospital settings. The common use of life support systems in health
care settings has increased the need for patients to express their wishes regarding
their desire to consent to or refuse the administration of life support measures by
executing written advance directives long before they are needed.
It was not long ago that questions dealing with the point at which biological
death occurred were not so complex.27 Advancements in medical technology have
enabled the indefinite functioning of vital body systems.28 As articulated by the
Leach court, “[s]ince, man, through his ingenuity, has created a new state of human
existence, minimal human life sustained by man-made life supports, it must now
devise and fashion rules and parameters for that existence.”29 Written advance
directives allow a person to clearly and expressly “fashion rules and parameters” for
their existence in the event that she becomes incompetent.
Because the primary function of hospital and nursing home settings is to prolong
a patient’s life, health care providers may be unable to distinguish between lifesaving
and life-extending measures and may be further unable to facilitate a suitable and
humane end of life medical care.30 Consequently, many patients spend the last days

26
Ernle W.D. Young, Ethical Issues at the End of Life, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 267
(1998) (“Ethical decision-making at the end of life has become more complicated as medical
technology continues to be developed and deployed at an accelerating rate. The successes of
medicine generate rising social expectations of the health care system. Americans are living
longer than ever before. They are now dying in hospitals rather than at home.”).
27

Leach I, 426 N.E.2d at 812.

28

Id.

29

Id.

30

See Young, supra note 26, at 268.
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of life suffering from the pain and discomfort that attends the administration of lifesustaining medical treatment, without any hope of regaining cognitive abilities.31
As life-sustaining medical technology has enabled the sustenance of a patient’s
biological life indefinitely, health care providers must determine which medical
treatment options will serve only to prolong a patient’s biological death.32 When
determining the type of medical treatment to be administered at the end of life, health
care providers may examine the “futility”33 of the medical treatment.34 “Futility”
refers to the likelihood that medical treatment will serve principally to prolong the
process of dying.35 Unlike an ineffective treatment that fails to accomplish its
purpose, a futile treatment may accomplish its purpose, but it will not benefit the
patient in any way.36
To the denial of death, we must add the delusion of medical immortality—the
widespread belief that the available technology has made death optional. A prominent
Stanford medical researcher confidently proclaimed at a conference, ‘death is one
more disease to be conquered.’ Daniel Callahan comments, it is regrettable that ‘death
has been hidden of late under the weight of a technological medicine that would treat
it as a kind of correctable accident, not a reality to be accepted as a fixed and
necessary part of life.’ … [A]cceptance of the naturalness of dying . . . directly
conflicts with the medicalization and legalization of death that characterizes modern
society's treatment of dying elderly patients. We prefer instead to believe that dying
results from disease and injury, which may yield to advances in medical technology.
The progressive move of dying out of the home and into acute and long-term care
facilities suggests that medicalization may be an irreversible process.”
Id.
31

Jeanine Lewis, Health and Welfare: Chapter 658: California’s Healthcare Decisions
Law, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 501, 505 (2000).
32

Leach I, 426 N.E.2d at 812. (“Edna Marie Leach is going to die. She is on the threshold
of death, and man has, through a new medical technology, devised a way of holding her on
that threshold. The basic question is how long will society require Mrs. Leach and others
similarly situated to remain on the threshold of certain death suspended and sustained there by
artificial life supports.”)
33
See Young, supra note 26, at 271 n.16 (stating that “[q]uantitative futility suggests a
treatment has not been statistically efficacious and is almost certainly not going to work if it is
tried again. Qualitative futility focuses on whether the proposed treatment offers any benefit to
the patient. Patients unable to appreciate any benefit of a treatment are receiving ‘futile’
therapy. Qualitative futility is more controversial, since it involves quality-of-life judgments.
It should be noted that care is never futile, but certain treatments may be.”).
34
Id. at 271-72 (“Situations of medical futility arise when, from the perspective of the
treating team, three conditions are present. First, further aggressive therapy would not benefit
the patient, violating the biomedical ethical principle of beneficence. Second, aggressive
therapy would serve only to meaninglessly prolong an inevitable process of dying, denying the
biomedical ethical principle of nonmaleficence. Third, therapy would squander finite and
even shrinking societal resources, contravening the principle of distributive justice.”).
35
36

Id.

The term “futile” should be distinguished from “ineffective.” See generally Lainie
Rutkow Notes, Dying to Live: The Effect of the Patient Self-Determination Act on Hospice
Care, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 393, 428 – 29 (2004) (“Unlike an ineffective
treatment, a futile procedure or therapy may accomplish what it is designed to do. The result
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For example, in the case of Edna Leach, administration of a respirator to facilitate
breathing could be deemed “futile” because its primary purpose was to prolong the
biological process of dying.37 While the ventilation accomplished its functional
purpose of mechanically maintaining Edna’s respiratory function, it was not
medically beneficial to her because she was in a terminal, vegetative state without
hope of recovery. Similarly, the administration of an artificial feeding tube was also
a futile treatment in Edna’s case. Like the ventilation treatment, artificial hydration
was intended only to facilitate the prolongation of her life.38 None of these lifesustaining measures could have cured her illness or rendered her healthy once again.
Rather, these measures merely delayed biological and physiological death.39
Unfortunately, futile life-sustaining medical treatment is frequently administered
in health care settings. The reason for doing so is that health care providers fear
medical malpractice lawsuits from a patient’s loved ones for not taking every
possible measure available to prevent the patient from dying.40 This fear of
malpractice liability increases the potential that providers will administer futile
medical treatments and therefore, the desire to avoid the administration of futile
medical treatment is a primary motivation for patients who execute advance
directives.
Another motivation for executing written advance directives is the desire to
provide written documentation to one’s health care provider regarding medical
treatment wishes. Sometimes health care providers are faced with the difficult
situation, both legally and emotionally, when the patient’s family disagrees with the
patient’s wishes, and the family attempts to assert their own beliefs in place of the
patient’s desires.41 In the absence of a legally executed written declaration,
oftentimes the health care provider will be forced to pursue the course of treatment
that satisfies the family members’ wishes.42 By providing a legally executed written

of the treatment, however, is of no help to a given patient. In other words, ‘[a] judgment of
futility is, strictly speaking, not the judgment that an intervention will be harmful, but only that
it will not be beneficial.’”).
37

See generally Leach I, 426 N.E.2d at 812; Leach II, 469 N.E.2d at 1047.

38

Id.

39

Id.

40

See Young, supra note 26, at 271 (stating that “[d]isagreements within families can
make timely and appropriate decision-making for incapacitated patients without advance
directives all but impossible. For example, where a son is asking that aggressive therapy be
withdrawn, and a daughter is threatening litigation unless ‘everything be done,’ the treatment
team will invariably maintain the status quo until the family is able to speak with a single
voice. Reconciliation of family members' disparate views of what the patient would have
wanted can sometimes occur; but, where there is a long history of division within the family,
reconciliation may not be possible. In such circumstances, the treating team will usually ‘play
it safe,’ and maintain a conservative course which may not necessarily be in the patient's best
interests.”).
41
42

Id.

Marshall B. Kapp, Legal Anxieties and End-of-Life Care in Nursing Homes, 19 ISSUES
L. & MED. 111, 119 (2003) (“‘Dead patients don’t sue, but live families do,’ ‘Doing what the
family demands is the path of least legal resistance,’ and ‘Do what the family wants and wait
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advance directive for the patient’s hospital record, the health care provider can
ensure that the patient’s wishes are being advanced, as opposed to the wishes of the
family members.
B. The “Evolution” of CPR and Its Impact at the End of Life
Cardiopulmonary resuscitation (“CPR”) is a procedure that was invented for the
purpose of restoring a person’s respiratory functions after a person suffers a cardiac
arrest; it incorporates the “clearance of air passages to the lungs, mouth-to-mouth
method of artificial respiration, and heart massage by the exertion of pressure on the
chest.”43 CPR was invented in the 1950’s for the purpose of restoring respiratory and
cardiac functions to persons suffering a cardiac arrest as a result of electrocution,
anesthesia, or heart attack.44
The American Heart Association’s45 2005 Guidelines identified three instances in
which CPR should not be initiated on a patient: 1) the patient has a valid Do Not
Resuscitate order; 2) the patient is already dead, or is showing physical signs of
irreversible death; and 3) the patient will not receive any physiological benefit from
CPR because vital bodily functions have deteriorated despite comprehensive
therapy.46 The third category encompasses elderly patients suffering from terminal
illness or degenerative, disabling diseases, with little to no chance of recovery; such
was the case with Edna Leach.47
for nature to solve the problem’ are veritable mantras among attending physicians, medical
directors, and other nursing home personnel.”).
43

Dictionary.com, http://www.merriam-webster.com/cgi-bin/mwmedsamp.

44

Paul C. Sorum, Limiting Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation, 57 ALB. L. REV. 617 (1994).

45

General information regarding the American Heart Association (“AHA”) and its
purpose, history, organizational structure and policies, can be found at the AHA’s official
website, www.americanheart.org. The American Heart Association is a “national voluntary
health agency whose mission is to reduce disability and death from cardiovascular diseases
and stroke.” Id.
46
See the American Heart Association’s 2005 Guidelines for Cardiopulmonary
Resuscitation and Emergency Cardiovascular care, Part 2: Ethical Issues, available at
http://circ.ahajournals.org/cgi/content/full/112/24_suppl/IV-6.
47

For a detailed analysis of the lack of effectiveness and high economic costs of cardio
pulmonary resuscitation (“CPR”), see generally Sorum, supra note 44, at 621-22.
The American Heart Association . . . distinguishes three categories of patients for
whom CPR might be deemed of no medical benefit: 1) the patient who, for practical
purposes, is already dead . . . 2) the patient whose cardiac arrest is the culmination of a
relentlessly deteriorating and terminal condition - for example, a patient in an
intensive care unit who is receiving maximal therapy but whose blood pressure or
oxygen level is nonetheless progressively falling; and 3) the patient whose serious
underlying disease puts him or her in a category in which survival after an arrest and
resuscitation until discharge from the hospital would be unprecedented, or, as others
would insist, a category in which survival is rare if not actually unprecedented - for
example, a patient with widely metastatic cancer, multiple organ failure, or sepsis. The
first two categories, in which the futility of CPR is obvious, need not concern us
much. . . . The real debate about futility thus narrows down to whether CPR can be
deemed futile in the third scenario where survival to hospital discharge would be
unprecedented or at least rare, as in fact the American Heart Association and the other
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In cases where patients in this third category receive CPR following a cardiac
arrest, the resuscitation is likely to be a futile and possibly brutal treatment48 and
thus, implicates ethical considerations regarding the administration of CPR. As one
writer noted, patients in this third category who do receive CPR and are resuscitated
are left in a medically “worse off” position than having not been resuscitated in the
first instance.49 CPR was never intended to be administered to terminally ill patients
with no hope of recovery.50 Not long after its inception, however, CPR became a
standard treatment for all patients:
[CPR] was invented . . . primarily for patients who, because of shocks
from electrical lines . . . or heart attacks, developed ventricular fibrillation
- the sudden onset of chaotic electrical activity in the muscle wall of the
ventricle . . . [b]ut quickly it was used . . . on patients without ventricular
fibrillation as well, that is, on types of patients for whom it was not
originally intended. Soon everyone in the hospital was . . . a candidate for
CPR, even when the cause of the arrest was chronic, not acute. CPR
became a right for all patients, although a rite of passage to death for
most.51
CPR was not intended for use on elderly patients whose bodies have succumbed
to a degenerative disease with little chance of recovery. In cases such as these,
where CPR is successfully administered and restores cardiac and respiratory
functions, the next step that often follows is the administration of life-sustaining
medical technologies, such as ventilators and nasogastric tubes to enable artificial
nutrition, as was the case with Edna Marie Leach.
The increase in the administration of CPR on elderly patients in the medical
setting necessarily increases the likelihood of patients having to confront the issue of
major proponents of the futility argument have claimed. This is indeed an important
issue, for with this third category of patients, unlike with the first two, we are facing
potentially enormous psychological and economic costs.
48
Rutkow, supra note 36, at 414-15 (stating that “[p]atients in hospice are among the
sickest patients in any health care facility; their bodies are usually very frail … [f]or a
terminally ill patient, [CPR] can be a brutal procedure. The following account describes a
medical resident’s experience administering CPR to an 84-year-old woman with heart and
kidney failure who experienced cardiac arrest: ‘I thrust down on her chest repeatedly. With
each stroke, her frail ribs snapped under my weight. Someone else prodded her neck and
groin, jabbing needles into her to gain IV access. A tube was jammed down her throat and
blood oozed from her mouth. We all stood back and watched as the defibrillator sent
electrical shocks ripping through her. We kept this up for 30 minutes. She was then declared
‘officially’ dead.”).
49

See Sorum, supra note 44, at 618–19 (“The results of CPR in adults are not encouraging.
Most patients die either immediately or within a few days. Only about a tenth of recipients live
long enough to leave the hospital. It seems, therefore, that CPR is a highly atypical medical
procedure in that most patients are worse off after it than before it.”).
50

Id. at 617-18. (combined with this generalized “loathing” of legal processes, there has
been a drastic increase in liability insurance rates for nursing homes . . . in Ohio alone, nursing
home insurance liability premiums increased a whopping thirty percent overall from 2000
through 2001.)
51

Id.
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the use of life-sustaining medical treatments. Thus, the increase in administration of
CPR has increased the need for patients to execute advance directives declaring what
types of life sustaining treatments a patient may or may not want to receive.
C. Medical Malpractice Liability Influences the Provider’s Decision of Whether to
Administer Futile Medical Treatment
When a health care provider determines the course of treatment to be
administered to a patient, the provider will often choose the treatment option that
presents the lowest risk of a medical malpractice suit, even if that treatment option
would be medically futile. Often, health care providers will administer futile lifesustaining treatment solely because the provider fears that foregoing such treatment
will instigate a medical malpractice lawsuit on behalf of emotionally charged family
members. Thus, while the number of medical malpractice lawsuits is increasing, an
advance directive executed in compliance with statutory requirements assures health
care providers that they will be shielded from malpractice liability for following a
patient’s wishes regarding desired treatment.
Malpractice liability is an increasingly important factor that arises in end of life
medical treatment decisions. As one writer noted, “a certain amount of generalized
fear and loathing of anything connected to the law, lawyers, or the legal process is
innate among all health care providers, especially in the [end of life] context.”52
Under Ohio law, in the case of a patient who does not have an advance directive
and is facing end of life medical treatment decisions, the patient’s spouse is the first
in line to make decisions on behalf of the patient.53 If the patient does not have a
surviving, competent spouse, the patient’s adult child will then make medical
treatment decisions on the patient’s behalf.54 However, where the patient has more
than one adult child, the majority of the patient’s adult children who are available
must agree on the medical treatment decision or course of treatment at issue.55
Where the patient’s children are not in agreement with either the doctor’s
recommended course of treatment or with each other, health care providers, when
choosing the course of treatment to be administered, will often choose the path that
presents the lowest risk of a medical malpractice suit.56 Indeed, even where a health
care provider determines that providing a certain type of end of life medical
treatment to a patient would be futile and only prolong the process of dying, if the
patient’s adult child or children demand aggressive life prolonging medical

52

See Kapp, supra note 42, at 118-19.

53
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.08 (B) (2) – (6) (West 1991) (stating, in part, that the
descending order of persons who have priority in making end of life treatment decisions on
behalf of a patient who does not have a written declaration of the patient’s wishes: “The
patient's spouse . . . [a]n adult child of the patient or, if there is more than one adult child, a
majority of the patient’s adult children who are available within a reasonable period of time
for consultation with the patient's attending physician . . . [t]he patient’s parents . . . [a]n adult
sibling of the patient or, if there is more than one adult sibling, a majority of the patient's adult
siblings who are available within a reasonable period of time for such consultation.”).
54

Id.

55

Id.

56

See generally Kapp, supra note 42.
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treatment, the child’s demand “virtually always controls the situation regardless of
how inappropriate that demand may be.”57
As one writer observed, health care providers administer end of life treatment on
the presumption that:
[A]ngry consultation with an attorney is the inevitable next step after
family dissatisfaction. The perception that the family is always looking
over the providers’ shoulders is exacerbated by the knowledge that adult
children often are irrational because they feel guilty and conflicted about
the parent being in a nursing home in the first place, and these emotions
are compounded when the parent is in the midst of dying. Several medical
directors interviewed spoke about inappropriately placing feeding tubes in
dying residents in order to “feed the family,” so that the family would be
able to say later, “[w]e did everything we could, but Mom died anyway so
it must be God’s will.” In some circumstances, a [family member] refuses
to make treatment decisions one way or the other; in such circumstances,
it is almost universally viewed by nursing home providers as legally safest
to err on the side of inflicting aggressive [life sustaining medical
treatment] on the dying resident.58
Because health care providers will likely be motivated to pursue treatment
options that pose the path of the least legal resistance, advance directives will often
prove to be a more reliable method for patients to communicate their wishes rather
than expecting that their wishes will be effectuated through the advocacy of their
spouses or children.59 Perhaps of even greater importance from a provider’s
perspective, health care providers who follow a patient’s legally executed advance
directive will be shielded from liability in the event that the patient’s family
members disagree with the patient’s decisions regarding end of life medical
treatment. Thus, an advance directive not only expressly communicates a patient’s
wishes, but it could likely prevent a physician from ignoring the patient’s wishes out
of fear that doing so will result in a lawsuit filed by the patient’s disgruntled family
members.
D. Conclusion of the Growing Need for Advance Directives
Advancements in medical treatments, combined with the increased number of
people who die in health care settings as opposed to their own homes, carry the risk
that many patients will be faced with decisions of whether or not to forego lifesustaining medical treatment and has increased the need for advance directives.
57

See id. at 119.

58

Id. at 119-20.

59

Id. (“The widespread notion that courts routinely interfere with EOL decision making
and always in the direction of ordering or approving aggressive life-sustaining medical
treatment . . . coupled with broad fear of regulatory sanctions for providing too little
aggressive life-sustaining medical treatment but never for trying too hard to cure dying
residents, often contributes to inappropriately aggressive resuscitation attempts and excessive
use--both initially and on a continuing basis--of feeding tubes in the nursing home. Action, or
“doing something,” is equated with good defensive medicine, even (maybe especially) in [end
of life] situations when it is destined to be non-beneficial.”)
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While competent patients can orally consent to or refuse medical treatment,
incompetent persons are legally incapable of doing so. Advance directives provide a
mechanism by which competent persons can expressly state which medical
treatments to accept or refuse in the future, in the event that the person becomes
incompetent due to disease or injury. Advance directives empower a patient to retain
the right to consent to or refuse futile and possibly brutal medical treatments such as
CPR, mechanical respiration and artificial hydration. Moreover, a legally executed
advance directive assures health care providers that they will be shielded from
malpractice liability for following a patient’s documented wishes regarding
treatment, even at the risk of angering a patient’s family members.
III. HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO REFUSE MEDICAL TREATMENT
The common law doctrine of informed consent is deeply rooted in American
jurisprudence. The United States Supreme Court has recognized a patient’s right to
refuse medical treatment as a logical corollary of the doctrine of informed consent
for over 100 years. Because informed consent is a doctrine firmly entrenched in
American law, the Court has recognized that both competent and incompetent
patients alike share the right to the refuse unwanted medical treatment.60 However,
states have not uniformly codified this right within the context of advance directive
statutes. Although the United States Supreme Court has recognized a patient’s right
to refuse treatment, analysis of the Ohio Revised Code advance directive statutes
reveals that a patient’s right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment in Ohio may
actually be harmed by the Code, rather than protected by it.
A. History of the Right to Refuse Medical Treatment Outside of Ohio
As early as 1891, the United States Supreme Court recognized that “[n]o right is
held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of
every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all
restraint or interference of others.”61 In 1914, Justice Cardozo articulated the
doctrine of informed consent by stating “[e]very human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a
surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an assault,

60
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990) (stating that “the
informed consent doctrine has become firmly entrenched in American tort law”).
61
Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 252 (1891) (refusing to compel
plaintiff to endure a medical examination regarding the injury that formed the basis of her
cause of action, stating that to compel someone to submit to “the touch of a stranger, without
lawful authority, is an indignity, an assault and a trespass”) (“No right is held more sacred, or
is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the
possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others,
unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”). Id. at 251. More recently, the Supreme
Court reiterated this position by holding that a competent person has a liberty interest under
the Due Process Clause in refusing unwanted medical treatment. See generally Cruzan, 497
U.S. at 278-80.
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for which he is liable in damages.”62 Accordingly, the doctrine of informed consent
conversely entails the right “not to consent” to medical treatment.63
For the next sixty years, the common law doctrine of informed consent evolved
rather slowly. Evolution of this doctrine primarily occurred within the context of an
incompetent mental health patient’s right to refuse psychiatric treatment.64 By 1976,
state supreme courts began recognizing the right to refuse medical treatment even
when the refusal would result in death.65 In the case of In re Quinlan, the New
Jersey Supreme Court held that the constitutional right to privacy encompasses a
“patient’s decision to decline medical treatment.”66
In 1990, the United States Supreme Court decided to confront the issue of the
right to refuse medical treatment.67 In the case of Cruzan,68 the Court held that a
competent person has a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause in refusing
unwanted medical treatment: “a competent person [has] a constitutionally protected
right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.”69 While noting that incompetent
patients have the same rights as competent patients to refuse unwanted treatment
because both groups are entitled to the same value of human dignity. The Cruzan
court noted that in the case of an incompetent patient, individual states have the right
to establish procedural safeguards to properly protect and ascertain what decisions
the patient would choose if the patient were competent to do so.70
Although the United States Supreme Court recognized a patient’s right to refuse
unwanted medical treatment as constitutionally protected, and found this right to be
deeply embedded within the common law doctrine of informed consent, the states

62

Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).

63

Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270. For an analysis of the legal history of the informed consent
doctrine, see generally Nancy M.P. King, Consent and the Courts: The Emergence of the
Legal Doctrine, in RUTH R. FADEN ET AL., A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT
(1986).
64

Bruce J. Winick, Advance Directive Instruments for Those with Mental Illness, 51 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 57, 58 (1996) (citing Alexander D. Brooks, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE
MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 609-18 (1974)).
65

In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (N.J. 1976) (recognizing that the unwritten
constitutional right to privacy “is broad enough to encompass a patient’s decision to decline
medical treatment under certain circumstances, in much the same way as it is broad enough to
encompass a woman’s decision to terminate pregnancy under certain conditions.”). Over the
past thirty years, courts have recognized a right to refuse treatment based on either the
common law doctrine of informed consent or on a constitutional privacy right. Cruzan, 497
U.S. at 271.
66

Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 663.

67

Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261.

68

Id.

69

Id. at 278-80 (citing cf., e. g., Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11, 24-30 (1905)); Id. at 27880 (basing this determination on its previous declaration that “[n]o right is held more sacred . .
. than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from
all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”).
70

Id. at 279-82.
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have not uniformly recognized this right within the context of advance directive
statutes. Instead, the respective states’ legislatures have remained disjointed in their
differing approaches to advance directive laws.
B. History of the Right to Refuse Medical Treatment in Ohio
Ohio’s history of the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment began with the 1982
Leach case. In 1984, Ohio’s Ninth District Court of Appeals declared that a patient
had an absolute right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment unless a court
determined that the state’s interests outweighed the patient’s individual interests. In
1991, Ohio adopted the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act which codified the
use and execution of advance directives and, regrettably, also adopted a civil and
criminal immunity statute which protected health care providers from legal liability
for non-compliance. By 1996, the Ohio Supreme Court issued a confusing, almost
contradictory opinion in Anderson where it both recognized the right of a patient to
refuse medical treatment as one rooted within the informed consent doctrine and
refused to allow a patient to recover damages for a violation of this right, reasoning
that to permit recovery would be analogous to recognizing the controversial
wrongful living cause of action. Currently, there has been no guidance. Analysis of
Ohio’s common law shows that the past twenty-five year history of an Ohio patient’s
right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment warrants further evolution.
1. The Leach Case
The 1981 death of Edna Marie Leach spawned the first case in Ohio that dealt
with the issue of a patient’s legal right to be removed from life support.71 In 1982,72
Edna’s family brought suit against the treating hospital, alleging the following: Edna
Leach was placed on life support without the consent of her family; the hospital
failed to advise the Leach family on the nature of Edna’s medical condition; and
during the two month period that Edna was on life support, the hospital administered
experimental medical treatments to Edna without her family’s consent.73 At that
time, there was no applicable Ohio statutory or case law in effect with which to
guide the Leach court.74 Rather, the court relied on case law from other states that
had recently addressed the issue of an incompetent, terminally ill patient’s right to
refuse treatment.75 The court recognized a constitutionally based right to refuse
treatment as part of the right to privacy, and thus, issued a court order directing the
hospital to discontinue life support. However, the court dismissed the Leachs’ tort
claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, because Ohio law

71
Leach v. Akron Gen. Med. Ctr., 426 N.E.2d 809, 812 (Summit County Ct. Com. Pl.
1980).
72

Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d 1047, 1051 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).

73

Id. at 1052, 1054.

74

Leach I, 426 N.E.2d at 812.

75

Id. at 812-13. (“While considerable law exists on the question of treatment, only five
states have addressed the question as posed to this court, that is, treatment of the terminally ill,
incompetent individual.”) (citations omitted).
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at the time required health care providers to obtain a court order before life-support
could be discontinued.76
On appeal in 1984, Ohio’s Ninth District Court of Appeals reinstated the Leach
family’s claims for non-disclosure, pain and suffering, mental anguish, and punitive
damages.77 The court affirmed the dismissal of the invasion of privacy claim,
reasoning that this was a personal right that lapsed upon the patient’s death.78 The
court held that a patient has an absolute right to refuse medical treatment unless
competing state interests outweigh the patient’s individual rights after being
evaluated in court proceedings.79 Since a patient’s right to refuse medical treatment
is a “logical extension of the consent requirement … [and] the existence of consent,
either express or implied, is a question of fact,”80 the case was remanded to the trial
76

Leach II, 469 N.E.2d at 1051. (stating that “[o]n July 9, 1982, plaintiffs filed this action
seeking damages for the time Mrs. Leach was on life support systems. Defendants filed a
motion in the alternative, to dismiss or for summary judgment. This motion was not supported
by affidavits or other evidence. Civ. R. 12(B) provides that a Civ. R. 12(B)(6) motion may be
converted to a motion for summary judgment, but requires that both parties be afforded the
opportunity to present evidence pertinent under Civ. R. 56. The court did not permit or receive
additional evidence, but, instead, treated defendants’ motion as one to dismiss for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The court granted defendants’ motion and
plaintiffs appeal.”). Id.
77

See generally id. at 1047.

78

Id. at 1054. (“The right to privacy is a right personal to the individual asserting it. This
right lapses with the death of the person who enjoys it and the decedent’s heirs may not
recover for the invasion.”) (citations omitted).
79

Leach II, 469 N.E.2d at 1051 – 52 (“While the patient’s right to refuse treatment is
qualified because it may be overborn (sic) by competing state interests, we believe that, absent
legislation to the contrary, the patient’s right to refuse treatment is absolute until the quality of
the competing interests is weighed in a court proceeding. We perceive this right as the logical
extension of the consent requirement and conclude that a patient may recover for battery if his
refusal is ignored.”).
80

Id. at 1052. The court discussed the nature of the implied consent doctrine, as well as the
impact of implied consent on that doctrine.
Not only must a patient consent to treatment, but the patient's consent must be
informed consent. There is no legal defense to battery based on consent if a patient's
consent to touching is given without sufficient knowledge and understanding of the
nature of the touching. The requirement of informed consent has its roots not only in
the patient's right to privacy but also in the nature of the physician-patient relationship.
The physician owes his patient a fiduciary duty of good faith and fair dealing which
gives rise to certain specific professional obligations. These obligations include not
only the duty to exercise due care and skill, but to fully inform the patient of his
condition and to obtain the patient's informed consent to the medical treatment. While
consent to a procedure is always required, courts have appreciated that circumstances
may render the patient's consent impossible or impracticable to obtain. Where the
patient is not competent to consent, an authorized person may consent in the patient's
behalf. In other circumstances the patient's consent, though not expressly given, will
be implied. Such circumstances must amount to more, however, than the mere
inability of the patient to consent. Express consent to treat a specific condition
through a surgical procedure may imply consent to all procedures necessary to achieve
that end, but not to procedures clearly not contemplated within the original consent.
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court for factual determinations.81 The appellate court concluded that because the
nature and existence of any consent rendered on behalf of the patient were
determinative as to whether the plaintiff was entitled to damages, the trial court erred
in dismissing plaintiff’s claims for failure to state a known cause of action.82 The trial
court did not, however, have the opportunity to hear the case on remand because the
defendant-hospital settled with the plaintiffs out of court. 83
2. The Modified Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act
Following Leach, Ohio adopted the Modified Uniform Rights of the Terminally
Ill Act (“Act”)84 in 1991.85 The Act governs the use of advance directives86 and
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment.87 While the Act sets forth provisions for
The patient's consent will also be implied where the patient is unable to consent and
there exists some emergency requiring immediate action to preserve the life or health
of the patient. The existence of consent, either express or implied, is a question of
fact.
Id. (citations omitted).
81

Id. at 1051. “A court may only grant a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion when it appears beyond
doubt from the complaint that plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to
relief. Under this standard we must reverse the trial court's decision. Id. (citation omitted).
82

Id. at 1053 –54.

The merits of plaintiffs' claims for relief depend upon the facts that are developed in
this case. The existence and nature of any consent, the existence and nature of any
refusal of treatment, the nature of the treatments before August 1, 1980, Mrs. Leach’s
condition on August 1, 1980, and the nature of the treatment on and after August 1,
1980, are all factual questions the answer to which determine whether plaintiffs are
entitled to relief. Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss Count 1 for failure to
state a claim should not have been granted.” Id. The appellate court did, however,
affirm the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s right to privacy claim because the claim
died with the patient, Edna Marie Leach. Id. “Plaintiffs seek to recover damages for
defendants’ alleged conduct which invaded Mrs. Leach's right to privacy. The right to
privacy is a right personal to the individual asserting it. This right lapses with the
death of the person who enjoys it and the decedent's heirs may not recover for the
invasion. Accordingly, the dismissal of this cause of action was proper.”
Id. at 1054. (citations omitted).
83

Vicki Joiner Bowers, Elder Law Symposium, Comment, Advance Directives: Peace of
Mind or False Security?, 26 STETSON L. REV. 677, n.138 (1996).
84
1991 Ohio Legis. Bull. 159, 166-76 (LexisNexis) (codified as OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2133.01 - .15 (2006)). For a detailed analysis of the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act
and the Uniform Health Care Decisions Act as adopted in the fifty states, see generally
Horttor, supra note 19.
85

See generally Horttor, supra note 19.

86
For a detailed discussion regarding the Modified Rights of the Terminally Ill Act and its
implications in Ohio, see generally Julie C. Vieson, Living Will Legislation in Ohio: The
Modified Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 969 (1993).
87
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.01 (West 2006) (defining life-sustaining treatment as “any
medical procedure, treatment, intervention, or other measure that, when administered to a
qualified patient or other patient, will serve principally to prolong the process of dying.”).
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executing advance directives, it does not guarantee that a patient’s advance directive
will actually be honored in a health care setting. In reality, the Act codifies civil and
criminal immunity for health care providers who do not abide by a patient’s advance
directive.88 As a result, the Act affords patients in Ohio no greater protection of the
right to refuse medical treatment through the use of an advance directive than
patients had before the Act was ratified.
The Act defines life-sustaining treatment as medical treatment that, “when
administered to a qualified patient…will serve principally to prolong the process of
dying.” 89 While the Act prescribes execution requirements that must be met in order
for the directive to be operative, it does not require a physician to obey a properly
executed directive.90 On the contrary, health care providers in Ohio are granted civil
and criminal statutory immunity for refusing to comply with a patient’s advance
directive “on the basis of a matter of conscience or on another basis[,]”91 so long as
the provider does not delay the transfer of the patient to a provider who is willing to
comply.92 The Act does not, however, define the terms ‘matter of conscience’ or
‘another basis,’ leaving such interpretations up to health care providers themselves.93
Nor does the Act state a time frame in which the transfer to a complying provider
must take place.94 Furthermore, the Act does not provide guidelines for how
aggressively a provider must seek out a complying physician.95
The Act, while providing guidelines for the execution of advance directives, does
not afford patients today any greater protection of the right to refuse medical
treatment than Edna Leach had. The Act does not lessen the potential for injury to
be inflicted upon the patient and the patient’s family by not abiding by a patient’s
wishes to refuse medical treatment, as was the case with Edna Leach. The Act uses
overly broad language which would allow a health care provider to substitute the
88

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.02 (D) (1) (West 2006).

[A]n attending physician of a declarant or a health care facility in which a declarant is
confined may refuse to comply or allow compliance with the declarant's declaration on
the basis of a matter of conscience or on another basis. An employee or agent of an
attending physician of a declarant or of a health care facility in which a declarant is
confined may refuse to comply with the declarant's declaration on the basis of a matter
of conscience.
Id.
89

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.01 (Z) (West 2006) (defining a “qualified patient” as “an
adult who has executed a declaration and has been determined to be in a terminal condition or
in a permanently unconscious state.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.01 (Q) (West 2006)
(defining life-sustaining treatment as any medical procedure, treatment, intervention, or other
measure that, when administered to a qualified patient or other patient, will serve principally
to prolong the process of dying).
90

See generally OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.01-15; § 2133.03 (West 2006).

91

§ 2133.02 (D) (1) (emphasis added).

92

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.10 (A) (West 2006).

93

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.01; § 2133 (D) (1) (West 2006).

94

See generally § 2133.01-15.

95

Id.

430

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 19:411

provider’s beliefs regarding medical treatments in the place of a patient’s, or
patient’s family’s own wishes.
IV. INSUFFICIENT COMMON LAW CAUSES OF ACTION IN OHIO
While statutory immunity for health care providers is a serious impediment to the
enforcement of one’s right to autonomy in Ohio, it is not the only barrier. Analysis
of Ohio law through Anderson, Allore, and Perkins demonstrates that the common
law causes of action of negligence, battery and intentional infliction of emotional
distress are inefficient remedies to compensate a patient whose advance directive has
been violated.96
A. Negligence
Interference with a person’s rights can either be intentional or negligent.97 To
establish a prima facie case of negligence against a health care provider, the plaintiff
must establish the elements of duty, breach, causation, and damages. Interference
with a patient’s right to refuse medical treatment constitutes a breach of a physician’s
duty to honor a patient’s wishes.98 Where a negligence suit is filed against a noncomplying provider on behalf of a patient whose advance directive was disregarded,
in order for a plaintiff to establish the breach of duty element, the plaintiff must
establish that the provider’s failure to abide by an advance directive was a deviation
from the relevant standard of conduct.99 The relevant standard of conduct is “that of
a reasonable specialist practicing medicine . . . in the light of present day scientific
knowledge in that specialty field.”100
The Allore court effectively denied recovery to a plaintiff because the plaintiff
failed to establish the breach of duty element.101 The court specifically found that
reasonable minds could not disagree that the health care providers did not deviate
from the relevant standard of care. By examining the relevant standard of conduct of

96
One commentator has noted that unlike the right to refuse medical treatment, a “review
of other fundamental rights shows that courts have upheld the protection of individual liberties
and autonomy rights, even when they disagree with how the individual exercises those rights
or see potentially harmful consequences following such an exercise.” S. Elizabeth Wilborn
Malloy, Beyond Misguided Paternalism: Resuscitating the Right to Refuse Medical Treatment,
33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1035, 1079 (1998) (comparing the right to refuse medical treatment
with a woman’s right to abortion and a citizen’s right to vote).
97

Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., 671 N.E.2d 225, 227 (Ohio 1996) (stating that
a “medical professional who has been trained to preserve life, and who has taken an oath to do
so, is relieved of that duty and is required by a legal duty to accede to a patient's express
refusal of medical treatment. Whether intentional or negligent, interference with a person’s
legal right to die would constitute a breach of that duty to honor the wishes of the patient.
Where a breach of duty has occurred, liability will not attach unless there is a causal
connection between the conduct of the medical professional and the loss suffered by the
patient.”).
98

Id.

99

Allore v. Flower Hosp., 699 N.E.2d 560, 561-63 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
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Bruni v. Tatsumi, 346 N.E.2d 673 (Ohio 1976).
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Allore, 699 N.E.2d at 562, 564.
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a “reasonable specialist,” the focus shifts away from the patient’s right to refuse
medical treatment to determining the acceptable standard within the medical
community. The very nature of this inquiry contradicts the principle of the informed
consent doctrine that an autonomous patient has a right to refuse treatment, even if
the refusal is harmful, unreasonable or even irrational. Thus, if a patient decides to
refuse medical treatment and a physician determines that such a refusal is harmful to
the patient’s health, the “reasonable specialist” could override the patient’s own
wishes and exercise wishes more consistent with those of a “reasonable specialist” in
the medical community.
The Anderson court denied recovery to a plaintiff based on the breach of duty,
causation, and damages elements of a negligence claim. Specifically, the court
reasoned that it would be difficult to determine what damages are caused by the
harm of resuscitation, and refused to recognize the plaintiff’s prolonged life as a type
of compensable harm traditionally associated with the damages element of a
negligence cause of action. A closer analysis of Anderson and Allore clearly show
that a negligence cause of action is an inadequate remedy to compensate a patient
whose advance directive has been violated.
1. Allore v. Flower Hospital
In Allore v. Flower Hospital, the plaintiff was unsuccessful in her attempt to
recover damages from the defendant-hospital for resuscitating the plaintiff’s
deceased husband, where the resuscitation was expressly proscribed in his living
will.102 The plaintiff alleged that by disregarding her decedent husband’s wishes as
contained in his living will, the health care providers employed by the defendanthospital were negligent in their care of her husband.103 The plaintiff’s suit was based
on four claims: negligence and battery on behalf of her deceased husband; loss of
consortium and severe emotional distress on her own behalf.104 The plaintiff’s
negligence cause of action specifically alleged that the hospital staff’s disregard for
the decedent’s wishes as expressed though his living will constituted medical
negligence.105
Plaintiff’s decedent-husband, Frank Allore, was diagnosed with asbestosis in
1976.106 Dr. Nasir Ali, the decedent’s primary care physician and pulmonologist,
treated decedent until his death on August 24, 1994.107 During a June 1994
hospitalization, the decedent executed both a living will and a durable power of
attorney for health care (“DPOAH”).108 The decedent’s DPOAH designated his wife,
Mary, to make health care decisions on his behalf in the event that he was unable to
do so.109 The living will stated that decedent did not wish to receive “‘life-sustaining
102

Allore, 699 N.E.2d at 560.

103

Id.

104

Id.

105

Id.

106

Id. at 561.

107

Id.

108

Id.

109

Id.
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treatment’ in the event that [he] suffered from a ‘terminal condition’ or was in a
‘permanently unconscious state.’”110 Both the primary care physician, Dr. Ali, and
Flower Hospital were aware that the decedent had executed these documents.111
“On August 22, 1994, Frank Allore was again admitted to Flower Hospital with
symptoms indicating tracheal bronchitis, severe chronic respiratory failure, and
resolving congestive heart failure.”112 Upon his admission, the decedent’s primary
care physician, in lieu of a DNR order, placed the following order in the decedent’s
hospital chart: “In the event of cardiac standstill, ventricular fibrillation or
respiratory arrest, resuscitation measures are to be initiated immediately using
[advanced cardiac life support] protocols ([w]ith attention to written code status
orders) . . . The physician will be notified immediately of any emergency
interventions by nursing personnel.”113
In the early hours of August 23, 1994, the decedent notified his attending nurse,
Kim Perry, that he had difficulty breathing.114 After noticing pulmonary edema,115
Nurse Perry tested the decedent’s blood oxygen level and subsequently contacted the
decedent’s primary care physician, Dr. Ali.116 However, Dr. Ali did not provide
Nurse Perry with any instructions regarding the treatment of the decedent.117 After a
subsequent assessment of decedent’s condition, Nurse Perry became frustrated by
Dr. Ali’s failure to provide specific orders over the telephone regarding the
decedent’s respiratory distress; this combined with her belief that the decedent was
suffering from a “cardiac problem,” she called cardiologist Dr. Nahhas.118 At this
point, neither Nurse Perry nor Dr. Nahhas was aware of the existence of the
decedent’s living will or DPOAH.119 Dr. Nahhas ordered the decedent to be
transferred to the intensive care unit, intubated,120 and placed on a mechanical
ventilator.121 After learning of the decedent’s living will later that day, Dr. Nahhas

110

Id.

111

Id.

112

Id.

113

Id.

114

Id.
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Pulmonary edema is defined as an “abnormal accumulation of fluid in the lungs.”
Merriam-Webster’s Medical Dictionary Online, http://www.merriam-webster.com/cgibin/mwmedsamp.
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Allore, 699 N.E.2d at 561.
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Id. at 562.
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Id. at 561.
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Intubation is defined as “the introduction of a tube into a hollow organ ([such] as the
trachea).” Merriam-Webster’s Medical Dictionary Online, http://www.merriamwebster.com/cgi-bin/mwmedsamp.
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Allore, 699 N.E.2d at 562.
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ordered the withdrawal of the decedent from the ventilator.122 Frank Allore died
shortly thereafter.123
The trial court found that resuscitating Frank Allore “was not a deviation from
the accepted standards of physician and/or nursing care;” it found that the plaintiff
did not meet her burden of establishing the breach element of her negligence cause
of action. Consequently, the Allore court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendant-hospital on all four of plaintiff’s claims. 124 The plaintiff subsequently
appealed.125 Ohio’s Sixth District Court of Appeals, relying on the Ohio Supreme
Court’s decision in Anderson,126 affirmed the trial court’s decision and consequently
deprived the plaintiff of any chance for redress.127 The Appellate Court analyzed the
impact of Anderson on the plaintiff’s negligence claim and reasoned that similar to
the facts of Anderson, here, resuscitating the decedent against his wishes was not a
compensable injury.128 Specifically, the Allore court determined that in the instant
case the plaintiff was seeking damages for the intubation of her decedent husband;
thus, “the ‘harm’ that was proximately caused by [the] medical professional’s breach
of duty in a prolongation of life case was the ‘benefit of life,’ a harm which courts
have repeatedly refused to compensate.”129 Accordingly, the court held that any

122

Id.

123

Id.

124

Id. at 563, 564. The court addressed the affidavit submitted by the decedent’s primary
care pulmonologist Dr. Ali, which opined that Dr. Nahhas and Nurse Perry did in fact deviate
from the relevant standard of care:
Here, [plaintiff] was required to offer specific, operative facts creating a genuine issue
of material fact on the question of whether, by resuscitation of the decedent, Dr.
Nahhas and Nurse Perry deviated from accepted standards of care for, respectively,
physicians and nurses. Dr. Ali opined that Nurse Perry sought to circumvent his
failure to order intubation and ventilation by ‘going behind his back’ to Dr. Nahhas
and that this act is a deviation from accepted nursing standards. There are no facts in
the record to support this inference. Instead, even in viewing the materials in support
of and in opposition to the motion for summary judgment in a light most favorable to
[plaintiff], reasonable minds could only conclude that no question of fact exists on the
issue of whether Nurse Perry followed the admission orders of Dr. Ali by informing
him of the emergency situation and, when he failed to respond, by calling Dr. Nahhas
for treatment orders. Dr. Nahhas, who was not informed of the existence of the living
will and durable power of attorney simply followed the standard of care employed in a
situation where life saving measures are necessary. Accordingly, the trial court did not
err in granting summary judgment on the issue of negligence as a matter of law and
[plaintiff’s] first assignment of error is not well-taken.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
125

Id. at 563.
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Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., 671 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1996).
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Allore, 699 N.E.2d at 565.
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Id. at 563.
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Id. at 563 (citing Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 225).
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recovery is limited to damages resulting from an alleged battery.130 Despite the fact
that the plaintiff sought damages for unnecessary medical bills that resulted from
unwanted medical care, because these damages flowed from the prolongation of her
deceased husband’s life, the court held they were not recoverable.131
2. Anderson v. St. Francis Hospital
In Anderson v. St. Francis Hosp., the Ohio Supreme Court132 denied recovery to a
plaintiff where the defendant hospital violated a patient’s Do Not Resuscitate
(“DNR”) Order.133 After the eighty-two year old patient, Mr. Winter, was admitted
to a hospital for chest pain, he informed his doctor that if his heart failed, he did not
wish to be resuscitated.134 Accordingly, his doctor noted a DNR Order in his hospital
chart.135 Three days later, Mr. Winter suffered a heart attack, and a hospital nurse
resuscitated him with defibrillation.136 He later suffered a stroke that paralyzed his
right side.137
Mr. Winter brought suit against the hospital for injuries resulting from the stroke,
alleging that the stroke he suffered would not have occurred but for the hospital’s
failure to obey the DNR order in his chart.138 Initially, the trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendant-hospital, holding that under Ohio law
plaintiff was unable to recover damages that were caused from the resuscitation,
because this would be the equivalent of recognizing the prolongation of life as a
compensable harm.139 The plaintiff appealed, and Ohio’s First District Court of
Appeals reversed in part, holding that when applying the elements of negligence and
battery, a plaintiff might be able to recover “damages for the reasonably foreseeable

130

Id.

131

Id. at 565.

132

Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 225.

133

See generally id. For a detailed, insightful discussion of Anderson illustrating that the
court imposed its own moral judgment on the situation and ultimately, a decision that
undermined a patient’s choice to forego treatment, see generally S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy,
Beyond Misguided Paternalism: Resuscitating the Right to Refuse Medical Treatment, 33
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1035, 1060-69 (1998).
134

Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 226. (“The plaintiff’s reason for not wanting to be resuscitated
stemmed from his fear of suffering the same fate as his wife, who had seriously deteriorated
following an emergency resuscitation.”)
135

Id.

136

Merriam-Webster’s Medical Dictionary Online, available at http://www.m-w.com/
(defining “defibrillation” as a process of applying an electric shock by an electronic device
that restores the rhythm of a fibrillating heart).
137

Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 226.

138

“Before his death, Winter initiated this action against the hospital for damages resulting
from the hospital’s failure to obey the “No Code Blue” order. After Winter died, appellee
Keith W. Anderson, administrator of Winter’s estate, amended the complaint to substitute
himself as plaintiff.” Id. at 225.
139

Id. at 226.
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consequences of an unwanted resuscitation.”140 The Ohio Supreme Court reviewed
the case on a discretionary appeal.141
The Ohio Supreme Court, however, did not allow Mr. Anderson to recover under
a negligence claim because of the difficulty that arises with establishing the
causation and damages elements. The court stated that the causation element of a
negligence cause of action could be satisfied in a case such as this only where the
plaintiff presented evidence that the defibrillation itself caused or contributed to a
resulting physical harm “in any way other than by simply prolonging his life.”142 The
court found that Mr. Winter did not provide such evidence and barred recovery,
stating that no issue better exhibits “the outer bounds of liability in the American
civil justice system than this [one].”143 The Anderson court reasoned that applying a
“but for” causation test to a case such as this one would be overly inclusive and
indicated that once the resuscitation is administered, there is no place for the “but
for” test to stop.144
Consequently, even if a plaintiff were able to prove the causation element in his
prima facie case of negligence, the Anderson court still would not allow a plaintiff in
Mr. Anderson’s position to recover damages because of the difficulty in ascertaining
exactly what damages are caused from the harm of a prolonged life.145 According to
the court, the faulty premise of Mr. Winter’s negligence argument was that his
damages flowed from the harm of being resuscitated and as a result, a prolonged
life.146 The court restated this point: “[t]here are some mistakes, indeed even

140

Id.

On remand, the trial court again granted summary judgment for the hospital. Applying
standards based on negligence and battery, a different panel of the same court of
appeals that had considered the first appeal reversed the judgment of the trial court,
holding that Anderson may be entitled to damages for the reasonably foreseeable
consequences of an unwanted resuscitation. The court remanded the cause for further
proceedings in accordance with its reasoning.
Id.
141

Id.

142

Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 229.

143

Id. (stating that “[f]or purposes of a ‘wrongful living’ cause of action, the event or loss
for which the plaintiff seeks damages is neither death nor life, but the prolongation of life.
Thus, once it is established that but for the conduct of the medical professional, death would
have resulted, the causation element of a ‘wrongful living’ claim is satisfied.”)
144
Id. at 228. (stating that if the “event would not have occurred 'but for' the defendant's
negligence, it still does not follow that there is liability, since other considerations remain to
be discussed and may prevent liability. It should be quite obvious that, once events are set in
motion, there is, in terms of causation alone, no place to stop.”)
145
146

Id.

Id. at 227. “American jurisprudence has developed at least three civil actions relating to
the beginning and the extension of life: ‘wrongful life,’ ‘wrongful birth’ and ‘wrongful living’
. . . ‘wrongful living’ . . . is the basis for recovery in this case.” Id.
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breaches of duty or technical assaults, that people make in this life that affect the
lives of others for which there simply should be no monetary compensation.”147
The Anderson court narrowly construed the causation element by not allowing
the act of resuscitation to be considered an injury capable of causing damage within
the context of a negligence cause of action. Consequently, it prevented Mr. Winter
from recovering for the type of damages that are caused from prolonging one’s
life.148 As one writer has suggested, the Anderson court incorrectly implied that the
plaintiff was seeking damages based on the wrongful extension of his life.149 In
actuality, the plaintiff was seeking damages for the harm of the “wrongful imposition
of [medical] treatment.”150 The Anderson court incorrectly focused its analysis on
the abstract question of whether death is ever preferable over life.151 Rather, the court
should have framed its analysis in the context of protecting Mr. Winter’s legally
recognized right to refuse unwanted treatment.152
When evaluating a plaintiff’s claim in the context of a negligence cause of action,
the plaintiff must prove his prima facie case consisting of the duty, breach, causation
and damages elements.153 A plaintiff must show that the health care providers
deviated from the relevant standard of care by administering life-sustaining treatment
to the patient. Moreover, a plaintiff must show that the damages he suffered were a
direct and proximate cause of the act that prolonged his life, such as the act of
defibrillation.154 The Allore court refused to find an act of resuscitation to be a
deviation from the relevant standard of care, even though the patient had a written
living will specifically prohibiting the same. While the Anderson court, in
147

Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 228.

148

Id.

In Winter’s first appeal, the court of appeals properly concluded that there is no cause
of action for ‘wrongful living’ and remanded for a determination of several issues
related to traditional negligence and battery. In the second appeal, the court held that a
patient may recover damages based upon the torts of negligence or battery for all the
foreseeable consequences of the therapy, including the pain, suffering, and emotional
distress beyond that which he normally would have suffered had the therapy not been
initiated. The record clearly indicates that Winter would have died on May 30, 1988,
without the defibrillation and, consequently, would not have suffered any subsequent
medical conditions. Thus, the court of appeals’ theory of recovery seems to be
identical to the theory of recovery underlying a claim of ‘wrongful living.’ Both the
law of the case and our holding here make this theory untenable, and damages, if any,
must be based strictly on the theories of negligence or battery.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
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Mark Strasser, A Jurisprudence in Disarray: On Battery, Wrongful Living, and the
Right to Bodily Integrity, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 997, 1023 (1999).
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See generally id.
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See generally Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 228.
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See generally Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990).
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Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 227.
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Id. (“[D]efendant is liable only for harms that are proximately caused by the tortious
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accordance with Cruzan,155 recognized that a cause of action arises from the violation
of a patient’s right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, the Anderson court
held that to recover damages a plaintiff must present evidence that the resuscitative
act itself caused the patient’s resulting physical harm, rather than a general showing
that the prolongation of the patient’s life enabled the harm to ensue.156
Because of the difficulties that plaintiffs face in seeking redress through a
negligence action, such as proving the breach, causation, and damages elements, as
evidenced by the Anderson and Allore decisions, negligence is an inadequate remedy
to compensate a patient whose advance directive has been violated.
B. Battery
In a medical setting, when a physician treats a patient without his consent, the
doctor has committed a battery157 even if the treatment is actually medically
beneficial.158 Thus, in Ohio, a battery action will lie where medical treatment is
administered after a patient expressly refuses consent.159 A battery claim requires a
plaintiff to show an “intentional, unconsented-to touching,” causation and damages
in the form of physical harm.160 Where a battery is physically harmless, the plaintiff
is only entitled to nominal damages.161 The common law battery cause of action
offers no greater chance of success to a patient in Ohio whose advance directive or
living will has been violated than does a negligence action, because the same
complications that courts face with respect to the causation and damages elements in
a negligence cause of action are present with a battery cause of action.
1. Anderson v. St. Francis Hospital
In Anderson, the Ohio Supreme Court held that where a plaintiff alleges a
medical battery, the plaintiff may only recover for physical damages directly caused
by the battery.162 Thus, where the battery was physically harmless, even if
emotionally harmful, the plaintiff is entitled only to nominal damages.163 While the
Anderson court acknowledged that a patient has a “liberty interest in refusing
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Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261.
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Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 226, 229.
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Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d 1047, 1048 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
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Edward J. Larson and Thomas A. Eaton, The Limits of Advance Directives: A History
and Assessment of the Patient Self-Determination Act, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 249 (1997).
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Allore v. Flower Hosp., 699 N.E.2d 560, 564 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
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Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 227.
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Id. at 229.

162

Id.
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Id. (citing Lacey v. Laird, 139 N.E.2d 26 (Ohio 1956)) (“‘Nominal damages’ are those
recoverable where a legal right is to be vindicated against an invasion thereof which has
produced no actual loss of any kind, or where, from the nature of the case, some injury has
been done, the extent of which the evidence fails to show. ‘Nominal damages’ are limited to
some small or nominal amount in terms of money.”).
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unwanted medical treatment,”164 it failed to protect that interest by allowing recovery
by a patient only where objective physical harm could be measured.165 As a result,
the court failed to acknowledge that violating a patient’s right to refuse medical
treatment could result in emotional or dignitary harm; neither of which can be
objectively measured.
The Anderson court focused on the damages portion of the plaintiff’s claim, as
opposed to focusing on the most important issue: the right of the plaintiff to be free
of the unwanted medical treatment of defibrillation. Instead, the Anderson court
offered only a passing assertion that “unwanted life-saving treatment does not go
undeterred” because the “consequences” of such treatment would include “damages
arising from any battery inflicted on the patient, as well as appropriate licensing
sanctions against the medical professionals.”166 The court did not, however, state
how nominal damages, which are the only damages that the court would allow for
emotional or dignitary harm, would deter future incidents of administering unwanted
treatment.167
In requiring objectively measurable physical harm in order for a patient to
recover damages under a battery cause of action, the Ohio Supreme Court
undermined the right to refuse medical treatment. This right was recognized by the
United States Supreme Court in Cruzan,168 which held that a competent person has a
liberty interest under the Due Process Clause in refusing unwanted medical
treatment.169 While the Anderson court briefly acknowledged this right as recognized
within Cruzan,170 it did not state how it expected this right to be protected without
affording a remedy to aggrieved patients.171 Namely, the Anderson court did not
justify why it would not allow the plaintiff to recover for an emotional or dignitary
harm caused where a health care provider intentionally disregarded a patient’s right
to refuse medical treatment; a right that the Cruzan court held was deeply embedded
in American jurisprudence. 172 As stated by the United States Supreme Court: “[i]t is
164

Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 227.
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Id. at 229.
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Id.
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See generally id.
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Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
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Id. at 278-80 (citing cf., e.g., Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11, 24-30 (1905)) (The
Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.” The principle that a competent person has a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be
inferred from our prior decisions. In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, for instance, the Court
balanced an individual’s liberty interest in declining an unwanted smallpox vaccine against the
State's interest in preventing disease.”) (citation omitted).
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Anderson, 671 N.E.2d at 227.
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See generally id.
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Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278-80 (basing this determination on its previous declaration that
“[n]o right is held more sacred . . . than the right of every individual to the possession and
control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and
unquestionable authority of law”).
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a settled and invariable principle, that every right, when withheld, must have a
remedy, and every injury its proper redress.”173 Accordingly, if the Ohio Supreme
Court recognizes the right to refuse treatment, it must afford a remedy where the
patient’s right has been withheld.
2. Allore v. Flower Hospital
The Allore court followed the reasoning in Anderson and denied the plaintiff
redress for the battery cause of action.174 While the court acknowledged that where a
health care provider treats a patient without obtaining the patient’s consent, even in
an emergency situation, the health care provider has committed a battery, it denied
the plaintiff recovery because the specific damages that plaintiff sought were not
related to the battery itself.175
The reason offered by the Allore court for denying the plaintiff recovery under a
battery theory was that the plaintiff had claimed damages wholly unrelated to the
battery itself: damages based on unwanted medical care, unnecessary medical bills,
unnecessary pain and suffering, and emotional distress suffered by her decedenthusband.176 The plaintiff “neither requested damages arising from the act of
intubation/ventilation itself nor for nominal damages for the battery.”177
By allowing only nominal damages under a battery cause of action where the
injury suffered was pain, suffering, and emotional distress, both the Anderson and
Allore courts failed to protect the patients’ rights to refuse medical treatment through
the use of written advance directives in Ohio.178 Thus, under current Ohio case law,
a battery action is an inadequate remedy to compensate a patient whose advance
directive has been violated.
C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Perkins
In Ohio, an intentional infliction of emotional distress action is also an
inadequate remedy to compensate a patient whose written health care directive has
been violated. In order for a plaintiff to recover, she must establish the provider’s
intent to cause serious emotional distress, extreme and outrageous conduct that
exceeds “all possible bounds of decency,”179 and causation.180 Insensitive or even
173

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 147 (1805).
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Allore v. Flower Hosp., 699 N.E.2d 560, 564-65 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
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Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d 1047, 1052 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (citing Wells
v. Van Nort, 125 N.E. 910 (Ohio 1919); Allore, 699 N.E.2d at 564 (“In a medical setting,
when a physician treats a person without consent, the doctor has committed a battery.”)
(citing Leach II, 469 N.E.2d at 1051). “In contrast, a physician’s acts are lawful when the
patient expressly consents prior to medical treatment.” Id. “Medical treatment also will be
lawful under the doctrine of implied consent when a medical emergency requires immediate
action to preserve the health or life of the patient.” Id. at 1052 (citing Wells, 125 N.E.2d 910).
“A potential patient may, however, expressly refuse treatment.” Leach II, 469 N.E.2d at 1053.
“If so, even in an emergency, any medical treatment is a battery.” Id. at 1052.
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Allore, 699 N.E.2d at 565.
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Id.
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Anderson v. St. Francis – St. George Hosp., 671 N.E.2d 225, 229 (Ohio 1996).
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Roelen v. Akron Beacon Journal, 199 F. Supp. 2d 685 (N.D. Ohio 2002).
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cruel conduct exhibited by a non-complying provider may not allow a plaintiff to
recover damages because such conduct may result in subjective emotional damage
that cannot be objectively measured.181
In the case of Perkins v. Lavin,182 Mrs. Perkins, the plaintiff and a Jehovah’s
Witness,183 executed a written directive in the form of a release, specifically stating
that she did not wish to receive any blood products or transfusions during a surgical
procedure.184 The written release absolved both her provider and the hospital from
the imposition of liability resulting from injuries incurred as a result of her not
receiving necessary blood products during surgery.185
Due to surgical complications, Mrs. Perkins’ blood count dropped and her
provider administered a blood transfusion as “a life-saving measure.”186 Mrs.
Perkins brought suit against her provider for battery and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The Perkins court examined the physician’s behavior in light of
the “average member of the community”187 and found the provider’s conduct to be

180

Fitzgerald v. Roadway Express, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 2d 839, 840 (N.D. Ohio 2003)
(describing “‘[e]xtreme and outrageous’ conduct as occurring in cases ‘in which the recitation
of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the
actor, and lead him to exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’”).
181

Roelen, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 696.
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Perkins v. Lavin, 648 N.E.2d 840 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
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Jehovah’s Witnesses hold as a tenant to their faith, that the Bible forbids blood
transfusions. The decision not to receive blood products is a “nonnegotiable religious stand
that Jehovah’s Witnesses take. They highly value life, and they seek good medical care. But
they are determined not to violate God's standard, which has been consistent: Those who
respect life as a gift from the Creator do not try to sustain life by taking in blood.” Information
regarding Jehovah’s Witnesses’ faith and doctrines can be found at the religion’s official
website: http://www.watchtower.org/. The website contains faith-based reasons for refusing
blood products, as well as medical treatment alternatives to blood products. Jehovah’s
Witnesses cite several passages from the Bible that allegedly forbid followers from receiving
blood products, including: Isaiah 48:17; Genesis 9:3-6; Leviticus 7:26; 17:10, 11 (Tanakh);
Leviticus 11:4-8; 13; 17:13, 14; Deuteronomy 23:12, 13; 15:23; Ezekiel 33:25; 1 Samuel
14:31-35; Acts 15:1-21.
184

Perkins, 648 N.E.2d at 840.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 842.
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reasonable.188 Thus, the court granted the provider summary judgment on the
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.189
To establish a prima facie case for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the
plaintiff must show that the conduct element is extreme and outrageous, and thus
shocking to an average member of the community. Consequently, the court did not
analyze the conduct in terms of the subjective view of the plaintiff. Instead, the court
focused on the conduct of the provider as viewed by the average member of the
community. The approach deemphasizes the very personal right to refuse medical
treatment whether or not the average member of the community would chose to do
so.
In Mrs. Perkins’ case, the decision to refuse a blood transfusion was a very
solemn and personal choice. Her reasons for doing so should not have to be validated
by a member of the “average” community. Rather, her choice, as expressed in a
written release form, should have been strictly respected and honored. Because the
conduct element of this cause of action is viewed in light of the average member of
the community, as opposed to the personal reasons a patient may have for refusing
medical treatment, the intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action
does not afford a remedy to a patient whose advance directive has been violated.
D. Conclusion of Ohio’s Insufficient Common Law Causes of Action
Ohio’s case law demonstrates that the common law causes of action of
negligence, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress are useless
remedies to compensate a patient whose right to refuse life-sustaining medical
treatment through the use of an advance directive has been violated. Negligence has
proven be an insufficient cause of action because of the difficulties a plaintiff will
face in establishing the breach, duty and causation elements in her prima facie case.
The Allore court refused to find resuscitation to be a deviation from the relevant
standard of care, focusing on the relevant standard of conduct of a “reasonable
specialist” rather than focusing on the health care provider’s blatant disregard of a
patient’s right to refuse medical treatment. The Anderson court refused to allow a
plaintiff to recover where the plaintiff suffered the harm of diminished health and
lifestyle resulting from a stroke that occurred following a resuscitation that he
expressly prohibited in the form of a DNR order in his hospital chart. Rather than
focusing on the administration of a medical treatment that was expressly forbidden
by the patient, the Anderson court analogized the patient’s claim to a wrongful living
cause of action, a cause of action not recognized or compensable under Ohio law.
The Anderson court reasoned that ultimately the elements of causation and damages

188

Id. (holding that “[d]efendant’s conduct that plaintiff claimed was an intentional
infliction of emotional distress on her was the provision of a blood transfusion that saved her
life and provided her an opportunity to raise the baby girl to which she had given birth just
days before. Rather than an average member of the community exclaiming that defendant
acted outrageously by providing that transfusion, such a person would view it as outrageous if
defendant had not provided it. Accordingly, there was no genuine issue of material fact and
defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law dismissing plaintiff’s claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. That part of plaintiff's second assignment of error
related to her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is overruled”).
189

Id.
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that resulted from resuscitating and prolonging one’s life are non-compensable
because the court cannot place a “price tag” on the value of one’s life.190
Both Allore and Anderson show that battery is also an inadequate remedy,
because of the same issues discussed by the Ohio Supreme Court in Anderson
regarding the causation and damages elements in a negligence action also plague the
battery cause of action. Finally, Perkins illustrates that intentional infliction of
emotional distress is an inefficient remedy because, similar to Allore and Anderson,
the court focused on the conduct of the health care provider as viewed by the average
member of the community, rather than the violation of the patient’s deeply personal
right to refuse medical treatment.
While analysis of the foregoing cases establishes that Ohio courts do not afford a
remedy where the right to refuse medical treatment through the use of a written
directive has been denied, the Ohio Legislature, through the adoption of a civil and
criminal statutory immunity provision within the Modified Rights of the Terminally
Ill Act, has also effectively stripped aggrieved patients of the right to a remedy.
Thus, it is up to the legislature, as the elected representative body of Ohio patients, to
take action and codify, protect and enforce the Ohio patient’s right to refuse medical
treatment through the use of a written advance directive.
V. PROPOSAL TO PROTECT THE OHIO PATIENT’S RIGHT TO AUTONOMY
The Modified Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act establishes guidelines for
executing written advance directives. It does not, however, establish any protection
for a patent’s right to refuse medical treatment through the use of advance directives.
Conversely, the Act codifies civil and criminal immunity for health care providers
who do not abide by a patient’s advance directive.191 As a result, health care
providers in Ohio are not legally obligated to strictly comply with a patient’s
advance directive or living will. The Ohio Legislature needs to take immediate
action to protect a patient’s right to refuse medical treatment by codifying a patient’s
right to seek a remedy when a provider disregards a written advance directive.
Furthermore, by repealing civil and criminal immunity and imposing monetary
sanctions against non-complying providers and institutions in the form of fines, the
legislature can deter provider non-compliance. Finally, educating state funded
institutions about the benefits of using a national Living Will Registry will
encourage compliance because of the relative ease of accessing directives through
the Registry.
A. Repeal Civil Statutory Immunity and Codify a Patient’s Right to Seek a Remedy
The Act’s civil and criminal immunity provision essentially protects health care
providers who fail to respect an individual’s right to refuse treatment as expressed in
a written advance directive. This undermines a principle central to the common law
doctrine of informed consent: that every adult of sound mind has the right to refuse
medical treatment.192 By granting civil and criminal statutory immunity, a patient is
effectively denied the right to recover damages from a provider who ignores a
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Anderson v. St. Francis – St. George Hosp., 671 N.E.2d 225, 228 (Ohio 1996).
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OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.02 (D) (1) (West 2006).
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Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).

2004-05]

THE CURRENT STATE OF ADVANCE DIRECTIVE LAW

443

patient’s advance directive.193 The right to refuse medical treatment has been
recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Cruzan. The Ohio Legislature
recognized this right by codifying the Modified Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill
Act. As a result, it seems that “[p]hysicians should not be able to make a
legislatively and judicially conferred right meaningless.”194 Thus, if a patient’s right
to refuse unwanted medical treatment is to have any significance, the Ohio
Legislature must provide a remedy for intentional or negligent violations of this
right.195
The grant of civil immunity under Ohio law invalidates a patient’s right to bodily
autonomy196 and allows health care providers too much discretion to “trump the
constitutional rights of patients.”197 In order to properly protect a patient’s right to
refuse medical treatment, the Ohio Legislature needs to repeal civil immunity for
health care providers who fail to comply with a patient’s written declaration refusing
medical treatment.198 By repealing civil immunity, health care providers could be
held liable for medical malpractice, and both health care providers and institutions
would have a financial incentive to educate and train health care providers regarding
the legal consequences of non-compliance.
Because the traditional common law causes of action of negligence, battery, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress do not currently afford a patient an
adequate remedy, codification of the right to seek a remedy, such as battery,
negligence or intentional infliction of emotional distress for advance directive
violations is the most practical solution. Codification of a remedy would logically fit
within Ohio’s Modified Rights of the Terminally Ill Act199 or Ohio’s Durable Powers
of Attorney for Heath Care statute200 because these statutes currently govern the use
and execution of written declarations, such as advance directives, living wills, and
powers of attorney, to consent to or refuse medical treatment on behalf of a patient.
Codification of a remedy would provide a uniform standard for health care providers
and institutions to follow and would guide such institutions in choosing the most
effective manner and means of education for providers and patients alike. Ohio
could look to the state of Tennessee as a starting point to find a statute that protects a
patient’s right to refuse treatment by exposing health care providers to civil liability
193

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.02 (D) (1) (West 2006).
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S. Elizabeth Wilborn, The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment Where There is a Right,
There Ought to be a Remedy, 25 N. KY. L. REV. 649, 672 (1998).
195
See generally id. See also Mary A. Bobinski, Autonomy and Privacy: Protecting
Patients from Their Physicians, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 291 (1994).
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Ohio is not alone in granting immunity to health care providers and institutions. See
generally ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.060 (e) (2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 36-3205 (1992); GA.
CODE ANN. § 31-32-8 (b) (1992); IOWA CODE § 144A.9 (2002) and § 144B.9 (2004); WASH.
REV. CODE § 70.122.060 (3) (1992).
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Maggie J. Randall Robb, Living Wills: The Right to Refuse Life Sustaining Treatment
– A Right Without a Remedy?, 23 U. DAYTON L. REV. 169, 185 (1997).
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OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.02 (D) (West 2006).
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OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.01-15 (West 2006).
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OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.11-17 (West 2006).
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for refusing to comply in “good faith” with a patient’s advance directive.201 By
repealing civil immunity and codifying a patient’s right to seek a remedy under a
common law cause of action, the legislature would effectively protect a patient’s
fundamental right to refuse unwanted medical treatment.
B. Repeal Criminal Statutory Immunity
In conjunction with repealing civil immunity, the Ohio legislature should repeal
statutory immunity202 to the extent that would allow the state to impose criminal
monetary sanctions on health care providers and their employer-institutions as a
result of violating a patient’s written declaration. While criminal sanctions will not
compensate aggrieved patients or their loved ones, imposing criminal sanctions in
the form of monetary fines would serve as an additional financial incentive for
providers to abide by a patient’s written declaration.
In addition, the legislature should require publication of the names of providers
and institutions criminally sanctioned for violating advance directives. Publishing
the identities of non-complying health care providers would encourage compliance
because providers will be motivated to safeguard their professional reputation within
the medical community. Non-complying providers could be identified by having
their names published on a health care institution accrediting agency’s website.203
Furthermore, publication on an accreditation website would be easily accessible to
the general public and would allow patients who have executed advance directives to
make informed decisions regarding where they choose to receive care.204 Health care
providers and institutions may feel a sense of embarrassment if the public is made
aware, through publication, of the imposition of criminal fines on them.
201
TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-108 (a) (2006) (stating that “[a]ny health care provider who
fails to make good faith reasonable efforts to comply with the preceding procedure as
prescribed by the attending physician shall be civilly liable and subject to professional
disciplinary action, including revocation or suspension of license.”). See also W. VA. CODE §
16-30-22 (2005) (“A health care provider or a health care facility is subject to review and
disciplinary action by the appropriate licensing board for failing to act in accordance with a
principal’s directives in a living will . . . [p]rovided, that the provider or facility had actual
knowledge of the directive.”).
202

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.02 (D) (West 2006).

203

For example, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations
(“JCAHO”) is an independent, non-profit organization that is governed by a board of
physicians, nurses, and consumers. JCAHO sets the standards by which health care quality is
measured in the United States, by evaluating the quality and safety of care for more
than 15,000 health care organizations. JCAHO conducts extensive on-site reviews of health
care institutions every three years. JCAHO accredited institutions and their inspection results
are posted on JCAHO’s official website, http://www.jcaho.org/index.htm. JCAHO’s 2005
Assisted Living Standards, http://www.jcaho.org/htba/assisted +living/05_al_xwalk.pdf.
(recognizing that an assisted living patient-resident has a “right to formulate advance
directive” and requires the providers in the assisted living community to determine “whether a
resident has advance directives or designated a surrogate decision maker for health care
decisions when the resident is admitted.”).
204

See generally Joint Commission Home Page, http://www.jcaho.org/index.htm (last
visited Oct. 18, 2006). For example, JCAHO has a “Quality Check” search engine available
on its website that allows a person to find JCAHO accredited institutions within a
geographical area for the type of care sought.
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C. Recognize a National Advance Directive205
In combination with repealing immunity and codifying a patient’s right to seek a
remedy, Ohio should promote and adopt a “national” advance directive form.206
More people might be encouraged to execute advance directives by simplifying
governing laws and achieving a uniformed system for advance care planning.207 The
implementation of a single advance directive that would be recognized in all fifty
states is one way to achieve this, and may simplify the process of executing an
advance directive by facilitating the creation of a straightforward, standard form that
can be easily read and understood by laymen. This alone may encourage more
Ohioans to execute advance directives, because the Ohio disclosure provisions that
currently accompany an advance directive total over 1600 words.208
In conjunction with codifying an adequate remedy and repealing civil and
criminal immunity, implementing a national form will ensure that out-of-state
persons’ advance directives are complied with throughout Ohio. While Ohio
statutory law recognizes an out-of-state advance directive as valid, so long as it was
executed in compliance with the legal requirements of the respective state in which it
was executed, someone within the health care setting would require the knowledge
needed to assess the legality of the out-of-state form.209 In an urgent medical
situation, where time is of the essence, a health care provider may not have the
luxury of the time it may take to contact the hospital’s legal department to determine
if the out-of-state advance directive is legally compliant with Ohio’s law; this could
increase the risk of non-compliance with an out-of-state form in the event that the
provider needs to make an immediate decision regarding the implementation of life
sustaining treatment.
Ohio’s current statutory provision validating out-of-state forms is of little to no
use to health care providers during a medical emergency when treatment decisions
need to be made instantaneously.210 As one writer noted, “the ever-increasing
mobility of society as well as the desires of an aging baby boomer population may
fuel an increasing demand for simplicity and flexibility in the legal tools we have
created for health care advance planning.”211 Accordingly, the implementation of a
national form would facilitate compliance from health providers by reducing anxiety
regarding legal requirements of execution for out-of-state advance directives.
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Charles P. Sabatino, Esq., National Advance Directives: One Attempt to Scale the
Barriers, 1-SPG NAELA J. 131 (2005).
206

See generally id. (for a detailed analysis of the use of one form as a national advance
directive, as well as the principal barriers to universal recognition in the fifty states).
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See Sabatino, supra note 205, at 132.

208

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1337.17 (West 2006).
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OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.14 (West 2006); see Sabatino, supra note 205, at 134.
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§ 2133.14.
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See Sabatino, supra note 205, at 154.
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D. Encourage Awareness of a National Living Will Directory
Repealing statutory civil and criminal immunity for non-complying providers,
codifying the right for patients to seek a remedy and adopting a national advance
directive form will encourage providers to comply with advance directives.
However, many providers will still be faced with administrative limitations that will
prevent them from accessing advance directives when they are needed. Many
patients execute advance directives long before they are needed; thus, when a patient
is later admitted to a hospital for treatment, the hospital staff may not be aware that
the patient has previously executed the advance directive if the patient is unable to
communicate.212 Additionally, in cases where a provider becomes aware of a
previously executed advance directive, if the date of execution appears too old, a
provider may question the accuracy of the document as a current reflection of the
patient’s true intentions regarding treatment decisions.
In order to encourage increased provider access to patient advance directives, the
Ohio Legislature should codify a requirement that institutions receiving state funding
provide education to hospital employees regarding the existence of the United States
Living Will Registry (“Registry”).213 The Registry is an electronic storage system
for advance directives that eliminates the need for health care institutions to maintain
their own storage or retrieval systems.214 The Registry is accessible by telephone or
212

Debra M. Bryan, It’s My Body and I’ll Die if I Want To: A Plan for Keeping Personal
Autonomy From Spinning Out of Control, 8 J. MED. & L. 45, 61 (2004) (stating that “[t]here
are additional programs in place to provide notice of advance directives. Many hospitals and
medical facilities have recording procedures in place, but a survey of these show great
disparity in consistency and reliability. Implementation of such record-keeping may be
cumbersome and difficult, especially for facilities whose personnel is already overburdened in
just caring for patients. In these situations, the United States Living Will Registry provides a
uniform and consistent way in which to store and access records. In addition to the free access
capability, medical facilities can join the registry's membership program. Although the
facility would pay a yearly fee, membership provides them with access to an automated
system. Through this system, medical personnel can obtain emergency contact or advance
directive information in a matter of minutes. Non-member facilities can access the registry
free of charge, but cannot access the automated version. In many cases, a medical facility's
membership would be offset by the amount of time, effort and expense it takes to administer
their own recordation procedure for advance directives, and would assure compliance and
consistency that may be otherwise questionable.”).
213

The Ohio Legislature could look to The Patient Self Determination Act (“PSDA”) for
guidance. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § § 4206, 4751,
104 Stat. 1388, 1388-115 to -117, 1388-204 to -206 (codified throughout 42 U.S.C.). The
PSDA is a federal law that requires institutions receiving federal Medicare or Medicaid
funding to inform patients of their rights to execute advance directives. For an analysis of the
impact and success of the PSDA, see generally Edward J. Larson and Thomas A. Eaton, The
Limits of Advance Directives: A History and Assessment of the Patient Self-Determination Act,
32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 249 (1997). See also Thaddeus Mason Pope, The Maladaptation of
Miranda to Advance Directives: A Critique of the Implementation of the Patient SelfDetermination Act, 9 HEALTH MATRIX 139 (1999).
214
The United States Living Will Registry, http://www.uslivingwill registry.com (Oct. 18,
2006) (“Certified Orthopedic Surgeon, Dr. Barmakian, has witnessed the ordeal of patients’
families as they confront the painful, guilt-ridden decisions of life support and medical
treatment. He has also felt the frustration of doctors who don't have access to patients’ wishes.
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internet twenty-four hours a day.215 Health care providers can request and receive an
advance directive from the Registry instantly.216 The Registry is self-funded and is
accessible to medical facilities free of charge.217
Health care providers can confidently rely on the accuracy of advance directives
maintained within the Registry because each registrant is contacted yearly to verify
that their advance directive wishes have not changed.218 Once an individual
(“declarant”) registers an advance directive with the Registry, the advance directive,
along with emergency contact information, is stored for the life of the declarant.219
Additionally, after registering an advance directive, the declarant is provided with
labels to attach to a driver’s license or health care insurance card which serves to
notify medical facilities that the declarant does in fact have a registered advance
directive on file, as well as a “wallet card”220 which provides instructions on how to
access the declarant’s advance directive.221
In addition to providing a uniform system of storing and retrieving advance
directives, the Registry would likely reduce the administrative costs that hospitals
currently endure to administer their own storage and retrieval systems for advance
directives and would increase provider compliance by making advance directives
easily accessible.222 By educating hospital staff about the benefits conferred on
health care providers utilizing the Registry, such as reduced administrative
burdens,223 health care institutions and providers can collectively determine the most

It was in 1996 that Dr. Barmakian first recognized the need for a registry service that not only
recorded patients' advance directives, but also made it easier for health care facilities to obtain
the information. Dr. Barmakian felt it was critical to establish a system which provides
medical personnel and patient’s families with advance directives whenever and wherever they
are needed while maintaining the patient's privacy and confidentiality. United States Living
Will Registry fulfills these criteria, providing easy, 24-hour access to patients’ wishes.”).
215

Id.
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Id.
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A sample “wallet card” can be viewed at: http://www.uslivingwillregistry.com/wallet
card.shtm.
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See Bryan, supra note 212.
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See generally Health Care Providers Benefits available at http://www.uslivingwill
registry.com (“People are commonly told to give copies of their advance directive to their
family members . . . [b]ut when the time comes to find the document, it is usually not
available, or is so old that some may doubt its validity. By definition, these documents are
prepared well in advance of when they will be needed, and they are commonly put away for
‘safe keeping’ . . . mak[ing] them difficult to find.”) (discussing that administrative issues such
as storage and retrieval of advance directives has proved to be a burden on health care
providers, as well as other legal concerns such as: determining which advance directive in a
patient’s file is the most recent version; not having sufficient time to locate an advance
directive when a patient is re-admitted to a hospital; not knowing how to properly store an
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efficient manner in which to incorporate use of the Registry into their own standard
operating procedures.
E. Conclusion of Proposals to Protect the Ohio Patient’s Right to Autonomy
The Modified Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, in its current state,
protects health care providers who do not comply with a patient’s advance directive.
The Act’s grant of civil and criminal statutory immunity effectively denies a patient
the right to recover damages from a provider who ignores a patient’s advance
directive.224 In order to protect a patient’s right to refuse medical treatment, the Ohio
Legislature needs to repeal civil and criminal immunity. In addition, the legislature
should codify the right of a patient to seek a remedy, because the common law
causes of action of battery, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress do not afford an adequate remedy to aggrieved patients. Additionally,
implementation of a national advance directive form would facilitate compliance
from providers by reducing insecurity regarding legal requirements of execution.
Finally, encouraging awareness of the United States Living Will Registry will
increase access to advance directives and allow them to be obtained instantly.
VI. CONCLUSION
Patients have the right to refuse medical treatment. Presently, competent patients
orally refuse medical treatment everyday. Because competence is required to
exercise the right to refuse certain medical treatment, many people choose to express
their wishes regarding future medical care in the form of a written advance directive.
An advance directive sets out, in writing, a person’s desires regarding medical
treatment in the event that the person cannot orally do so as a result of a mentally
debilitating disease or injury. When a person becomes incompetent, he cannot orally
consent or refuse to consent to certain medical treatments. Executing a written
advance directive gives a person the option to preclude certain types of future
medical treatment in the event that he becomes unable to orally consent to or refuse
medical treatment.
Modern advancements in medical treatments have increased the need for patients
to execute advance directives while planning for end-of-life decisions.225 Advance
directives are a viable legal option available to patients who choose to protect their
right to refuse medical treatment in the event that their mental competency is lost to
injury or disease.226 In order to protect a patient’s right to refuse medical treatment,
the legislature needs to repeal the statutory immunity granted to health care providers
who violate a patient’s written advance directive, impose sanctions in the form of
advance directive when a patient’s file is converted to microfiche or an electronic storage
database).
224

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.02 (D) (1) (West 2006).
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See generally RONALD E. CRANFORD, MODERN TECHNOLOGY AND THE CARE OF THE
DYING, IN BIRTH TO DEATH: SCIENCE AND BIOETHICS 191-97 (David C. Thomasma &
Thomasine Kushner eds., Cambridge University Press 1996); see also Developments in the
Law -- Medical Technology and the Law, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1519, 1522 (1990).
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See generally id. (for an analysis regarding “the relationship between law and medicine
in . . . the major areas in which advances in medical knowledge have created legal, ethical,
political, and economic dilemmas beyond those encountered in ‘traditional’ medicine.”).
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monetary fines against non-complying providers and institutions, and codify a
patient’s right to seek a remedy. Additionally, recognition of a national advance
directive form would encourage greater provider compliance by providing an easily
recognizable form with standard execution requirements. Lastly, requiring state
funded institutions to educate hospital staff about the benefits of utilizing the United
States Living Will Registry will facilitate easier access to patient advance directives
by providers.
Over the past twenty-six years, Ohio law has not increased the protection of a
patient’s right to refuse medical treatment through the use of a written declaration.
In 1980, at the time of Edna Leach’s death, patient consent had to be expressed
orally either by the competent patient who was able to communicate or through an
incompetent patient’s family members. Although the Modified Uniform Rights of
the Terminally Ill Act was codified in 1991 and grants civil and criminal statutory
immunity to providers who do not comply with an advance directive, it is virtually
worthless in terms of the protection it provides over a patient’s right to refuse future
medical treatment. Thus, a patient executing a written advance directive today will
enjoy no greater assurance that her wishes regarding treatment decisions will be
complied with any more than Edna Leach’s wishes were complied with as expressed
through her family members twenty-six years ago.
As medical technology continues to rapidly accelerate and the law continues to
lag behind, the consequence will be the evisceration of fundamental rights, such as
the right to bodily integrity and the right to be free of unwanted contact in a medical
setting. The legislature owes a duty to its citizens to protect patients’ rights to refuse
treatment at the end of life. Until the Ohio Legislature increases protection of a
patient’s right to refuse medical treatment through an advance directive, the right to
refuse medical treatment in Ohio is a right without a remedy.227
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